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The optical unconscious of Big Data:
Datafication of vision and care for
unknown futures
Daniela Agostinho
Abstract
Ever since Big Data became a mot du jour across social fields, optical metaphors such as the microscope began to surface
in popular discourse to describe and qualify its epistemological impact. While the persistence of optics seems to be at
odds with the datafication of vision, this article suggests that the optical metaphor offers an opportunity to reflect about
the material consequences of the modes of seeing and knowing that currently shape datafied worlds. Drawing on feminist
new materialism, the article investigates the optical metaphor as a material-discursive practice that actively constitutes
the world, as metaphors imply modes of thinking, knowing and doing that have material enactions. Expanding visual
culture theories, the notion of ‘optical unconscious’ is taken up to discuss the tensions between displacement and
persistence of optics within datafied worlds, that is, how optical vision is displaced but also mobilised and repurposed by
data-driven knowledge. In dialogue with feminist science and technology studies and speculative ethics, I suggest that the
datafication of vision offers a chance to reconceptualize the sense of sight towards a sensorial engagement with Big Data
premised on responsibility, care, and an ethics of unknowability. Within this framework, vision may be conceived
differently, perhaps not only as enhancement and control, but as generator of new possibilities. Ultimately, the article
proposes that the visual theories after which Big Data is being imagined matter not only for our understanding of Big
Data’s epistemic potential, but also for the possibility of shaping emerging data worlds.
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Ever since Big Data became a mot du jour across social
ﬁelds, optical metaphors such as the microscope have
begun to surface in popular discourse to describe and
qualify its epistemological impact. From business to
healthcare, Big Data has been equalled to the ‘measure-
ment revolution’ ushered in by the microscope (Herzog,
2014), compared to an optical instrument that could
propel a ‘new age of discovery’ (Christakis et al.,
2017), or even branded, more straightforwardly, as
‘the microscope of the 21st century’ (Higginbotham,
2011). In a documentary entitled ‘The Human Face
of Big Data’ (2016), Jay Walker, described as a business
inventor and entrepreneur, speaks enthusiastically
about the ‘invisible worlds’ opened up by Big Data,
comparing it to the perceptual changes introduced by
the microscope:
But now there’s actually a super visual world that is
coming into play. Ironically big data is a microscope.
We’re now collecting exo-bits and peda-bites of data
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and we’re looking through that microscope using incred-
ibly powerful algorithms to see what we would never see
before. (Walker in PBS, 2016, emphasis added)
These are but a few examples of numerous visual
and optical metaphors in place to describe Big Data.
I transcribe this last one as the phrasing most directly
conﬂates the microscope of the past with the algorithms
used in the present to sort information and thereby
reveal a ‘super visual world’. Big Data here oﬀers a
promise of enhanced knowledge, which amounts to
seeing more than ever before. As a visual culture scho-
lar, I am struck by the surfacing of the ocular in the
social imagination of Big Data, and its implications for
how we perceive and understand the epistemological
potential of large scale information. Why does the
metaphor of the lens emerge at this point? And what
is at stake in imagining Big Data through optics?
This reliance on optical metaphors is particularly
curious if we think of how vision is increasingly data-
ﬁed, a shift that I term here dataﬁcation of vision.
Dataﬁcation has been broadly deﬁned as the process
through which human activities are converted to data
which can then be mobilised for diﬀerent purposes
(Flyverbom and Murray, 2018; Mayer-Scho¨nberger
and Cukier, 2013). Drawing on this understanding,
dataﬁcation of vision points towards a set of phenom-
ena whereby the visual world is increasingly rendered
through and as data. Machine vision is one example,
whereby machines convert that which humans can see
into data to be treated by algorithms, thus amplifying
the capacities of human vision. Take for instance the
billions of images uploaded daily to Facebook, which
are processed by algorithms far more than they will
ever be seen by humans. Machine vision occurs through
data, not optical means, and through dataﬁcation,
vision becomes essentially post-optical (Kane, 2014;
Rettberg, 2017). The pervasiveness of data visualization
as a genre is another noticeable example. Data visual-
ization implies an apprehension of the social world
through dataﬁed modes of knowledge production that
are then translated into visual form, but this process of
translation remains absent from the ﬁnal visualization
(Drucker, 2017; Galloway, 2011). A consequence of
this process is that data visualization largely reinscribes
the ﬁgure of the omniscient, autonomous subject placed
in an observer-independent relation to knowledge
(Drucker, 2017).2 So while there is a shift from optics
to dataﬁcation, at the same time there is a reinscription
of a subject of knowledge that is consistent with
modern optics-based observation. This raises a set of
questions that I would like to expand on: why is it that
the sense of sight, in its shift to dataﬁcation, is being
mobilised and recast through the modern, un-situated
observing subject who aims to render the world as
knowable through ampliﬁcation of senses? Can dataﬁ-
cation of vision be instead an opportunity to redirect
the sense of sight towards a diﬀerent engagement with
large-scale information, perhaps an engagement
premised not on eﬃciency and enhancement, but on
dignity, ethical responsibility and care for what is not
known? If dataﬁcation of vision is premised on know-
ing, amplifying, mastering, and controlling, might there
be other models of vision available, or other modes of
sensorial engagement, that can instead redirect emer-
ging data worlds towards ethical responsibility and
reciprocity between knower and known?
Rather than dismissing the optical metaphor as a
mere trope to imagine the epistemological (and surely
economical) potential of Big Data, I take it as an
opportunity to reﬂect about the material consequences
of the modes of seeing and knowing that currently
shape dataﬁed worlds. I thus understand metaphors
to actually shape the world, as metaphors imply
modes of thinking and doing that actively constitute
the world that we live in, and constitute us as subjects
and objects of knowledge (Barad, 2007). When I speak
of metaphors I therefore do not stay just within the
domain of linguistic or cultural imagination, but I am
rather concerned with how the modes of thinking,
knowing and doing implied by metaphors are actually
constituting emerging dataﬁed worlds. The article
begins by drawing on feminist new materialism to con-
sider the materiality of metaphors and how they come
to shape knowledge practices. Expanding visual culture
theories, the notion of optical unconscious of Big Data
is proposed to discuss the tensions between displace-
ment and persistence of optics within dataﬁed worlds,
that is, how optical vision is implicated, mobilised and
repurposed by data-driven knowledge, even though
dataﬁcation seems to do away with sight. In dialogue
with feminist science and technology studies and specu-
lative ethics, I suggest that the dataﬁcation of vision
oﬀers a chance to reconceptualize the sense of sight
towards a sensorial engagement with Big Data pre-
mised on responsibility, care, and an ethics of unknow-
ability. Ultimately, the article proposes that the visual
theories after which Big Data is being imagined matter
not only for our understanding of Big Data’s epistemo-
logical potential, but also for the possibility of shaping
emerging data worlds.
Optical metaphors and how they come
to matter
Despite decades of intellectual inquiry interrogating the
privilege of vision in the hierarchy of the senses and its
complicity with projects of political and social control
(Crary, 1992; Foucault, 1997; Haraway, 1988; hooks,
1992; Jameson, 1992; Jay, 1994; Levin, 1993; Marks,
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2002; Merleau-Ponty, 1968; Mulvey, 1975; Sobchack,
1992; Winnubst, 2006), vocabularies of vision still
permeate language and are often foundational in the
writing of disciplines.3 Feminist historians of science
Evelyn Fox Keller and Christine Grontkowski have
drawn attention to the role of the visual metaphor in
Western epistemology. Unnoticed, they claim, these
visual tropes can inform our shared concepts of know-
ledge and the language in which those concepts are for-
mulated (Keller and Grontkowski, 2004: 208). Because
these formulations ‘carry assumptions which might have
inadvertently crept into our conceptions of knowledge
as a consequence of our reliance on the visual metaphor’
(Keller and Grontkowski, 2004: 208), it is important to
inquire into the ways in which this reliance has informed
the way we value speciﬁc forms of knowledge-making.
Through which kind of theories of vision is Big Data
socially imagined? And what kinds of epistemic models
are we enabling and disabling through them?
The fact that optical metaphors can inform shared
concepts and practices of knowledge suggests that meta-
phors, and languagemore broadly, have amaterial exist-
ence. As discussions conducted by feminist new
materialisms have pointed out, this does not mean that
material reality is solely produced by discourse, but
rather that discursive production is embedded in mater-
ial phenomena, and often ‘scripted ontomaterial bodies’
(Alaimo and Hekman, 2008: 9). Karen Barad in particu-
lar has drawn attention to material-discursive ‘intra-
actions’, that is, to how discursivity and materiality are
not independent realms that refer to one another, but
actively shape and make each other through mutual,
‘intra-active becoming’. In other words, practices are
constituted by both discourses and materialities:
The relationship between the material and the discur-
sive is one of mutual entailment. Neither discursive
practices nor material phenomena are ontologically or
epistemologically prior. Neither can be explained in
terms of the other. Neither is reducible to the other.
Neither has privileged status in determining the other.
Neither is articulated or articulable in the absence of
the other; matter and meaning are mutually articulated.
(Barad, 2007: 152)
From this follows that discourse does not exist without
being materialized in some form, that is, meanings are
materially enacted in practice (Orlikowski and Scott,
2015). This understanding underlies Barad’s account
of performativity, which shifts the focus from represen-
tationalism and ‘questions of correspondence between
descriptions and reality (e.g., do they mirror nature or
culture?) to matters of practices/doings/actions’ (Barad,
2003: 802). Material-discursive practices are rather con-
stitutive, they are performative, they make diﬀerent
worlds. They thus eﬀect ‘real consequences, interven-
tions, creative possibilities, and responsibilities of
intra-acting within and as part of the world’ (Barad,
2007: 37).
Take again the example of machine vision. One
could say that the ‘vision’ in machine vision is also a
metaphor, insofar as machines do not see in the same
way as humans do. In literary studies one would call
this ‘catachresis’, an example of which would be the
‘legs’ of a table. But machinic vision ceases to be meta-
phorical as it becomes a practice that permeates social
life, from facial recognition algorithms used by
Facebook to those used by bank security systems to
safely identify individuals (Rettberg, 2017), to a point
where the visual sense needs to be (or is already being)
reconceptualized, or at least contend with the fact that
humans and animals are no longer the only beings that
see. Machine vision oﬀers the promise of enhancing
human vision, of seeing more and diﬀerently, similarly
to the microscope or the telescope. While seemingly
metaphorical, the vision in machine vision actually
reshapes what it means to see, it makes a diﬀerent
world. Machine vision is a material-discursive practice
that implies historical modes of seeing that emerge from
joint developments in science as well as in disciplinary
and control societies. As a material-discursive practice,
it is indebted to discourses about seeing and being seen,
and material enactions such as facial recognition that
extend and refashion such discourses. I thus draw a
connection between the metaphorical imagination of
Big Data writ large and the speciﬁc processes implied
by dataﬁcation of vision to argue that the two are co-
constitutive: the fact that Big Data is imagined through
optical metaphors is part of the same phenomenon
through which machines acquire – and thereby reshape
– vision. Big Data is imagined as a microscope because
the modes of seeing implied by the microscope –
enhancement of the senses and heightened knowability
– are already being materially mobilized into dataﬁed
modes of knowledge production such as machine
vision. The optical and the post-optical make each
other. This is why it matters to attend to notions of
seeing implied by optical metaphors, as these meta-
phors are performed into being. This is also why it
matters to think about, conceive and emphasize other
modes of seeing and sensing, as they can be enacted
towards diﬀerent practices and engagements with
data, as ‘practices always have the potential to perform
something diﬀerent’ (Scott and Orlikowski, 2014: 878).
I shall return to this question in the last section of the
article.
Treating material-discursive practices as performa-
tive thus entails ‘tracing the genealogy of practices
that have enacted certain phenomena over time so as
to understand how particular distinctions, boundaries
Agostinho 3
and properties have been historically produced, stabi-
lized and destabilized’ (Czarniawska, 2016: 93).
Metaphors often gesture towards genealogies that
become naturalized through actual practices. With
this in mind, I shall now turn my attention to the
genealogy of displacement and persistence of optics in
Big Data through the notion of ‘optical unconscious’.
Big Data’s optical unconscious
While vision, through dataﬁcation, has become essen-
tially post-optical (Kane, 2014), discourses on Big Data
still rely on optical metaphors to make sense of chan-
ging practices in the treatment of large-scale informa-
tion, which suggests that opticality and the modes of
observation it generated still shape the way dataﬁcation
is coming into being. I propose that the optical meta-
phor can be read as a symptom of an ‘optical uncon-
scious’ that continues to haunt contemporary dataﬁed
modes of knowledge production. While this optical per-
sistence does not mean that vision still operates in the
same ways, it does point towards the need to pay atten-
tion to remnants of optical epistemes that continue in
play. This means that optical metaphors are not only an
easy, perhaps comforting way to convey the complexity
of large-scale information to lay people. What I suggest
is that modern modes of observation that came into
fruition through optics (for instance, the promise of
enhancing the senses) are still at work in the dataﬁca-
tion of vision. Through dataﬁcation, optics is both dis-
placed and reinstated.
While the billions of images uploaded daily to
Facebook are certainly read by algorithms far more
than they will ever be seen by humans, it is also true
that those images are often screened by humans working
for content moderation companies outsourced by
Facebook, and that this invisibilized and often low-
paid labour complicates the notion of machine-to-
machine vision (Roberts, 2018). At the same time,
these billions of images meant to be read by machines
also emerge from (and are read within) a limited set of
representational possibilities, such as a racially saturated
ﬁeld of visibility or prescribed modes of gendered behav-
iour (Alexander, 1994; Browne, 2015; Butler, 1993;
Chun and Friedland, 2015; Keeling, 2005) that run
deeper than the often criticised datasets in machine
learning. This means that, even though dataﬁcation
seems to do away with the ﬁeld of vision as we know
it, in fact older modes of visual engagement are still very
much in function, but have moved further beyond the
threshold of human perception. Overemphasizing the
paradigm shift of machinic vision thus runs the risk of
overlooking ideologies and structural inequalities (of
seeing and being seen) that are already hardwired into
the dataﬁcation of vision.
The notion of ‘optical unconscious’ that I take up
here was introduced by German cultural theorist
Walter Benjamin in his writings about technology, in
particular in his essay ‘Little History of Photography’,
where he proposes that photography as a visual tech-
nology oﬀered unprecedented access to hitherto unno-
ticed phenomena, either too minuscule or too rapid for
the unaided human eye to see (Benjamin, 1999 [1931]).
In his essay on the ‘Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction’, Benjamin goes on to pro-
pose that slow motion and close-ups open ‘a vast and
unsuspected ﬁeld of action. . . And just as enlargement
not merely clariﬁes what we see indistinctly ‘‘in any
case’’, but brings to light entirely new structures of
matter’ (Benjamin, 2008 [1936]: 37). In both essays,
Benjamin claims that the camera enables the discovery
of the optical unconscious, just as psychoanalysis
enabled the discovery of the instinctual unconscious.4
Yet, quite unlike the fantasies of knowledge con-
veyed by optical metaphors such as the microscope,
and the ‘super visual worlds’ enabled by them, the
lens-based medium in Benjamin’s writings always chal-
lenges the fantasy of mastery that couches the desire to
see and to know. While he did marvel at the perceptual
enhancement of material reality, he also emphasized
how these media aﬀected and changed the reality it
oﬀers unprecedented access to. As Smith and
Sliwinski put it, his
consideration of the optical unconscious attunes us to
all that is not consciously controlled in the making,
circulation, and viewing of photographs, the contin-
gency involved in the production and consumption of
images, as well as the unexamined motivations and
eﬀects of this technology’s pervasive spread into
wider and wider spheres of human and nonhuman
activity. (Smith and Sliwinski, 2017: 2)
Indeed, Benjamin noted early on that photography was
being widely adopted by everyday users and applied to
manifold domains of social life, what we today term
ubiquitous photography (Kember, 2012). But while he
recognized the increased pervasiveness of lens-based
media such as photography and later ﬁlm, he never
ceased to emphasize the blind spots that these technol-
ogies open up, alongside the new structures of matter
they reveal. In other words, Benjamin pointed towards
how the lens-based medium opened up spaces of
unknowability, rather than just new opportunities for
control and mastery.
Taking the cue from Benjamin, I ask whether we can
take the optical unconscious at play in Big Data, not as
a model that extends to Big Data the fantasies of con-
trol and mastery oﬀered by modern optics, but as a
material-discursive practice that opens up space for
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the unknown and unknowability. I thus see the optical
metaphor as an opportunity to reclaim vision, to re-
route it from current and emerging regimes of dataﬁed
calculation that extend the project of modern objective
observation. Can we cultivate the unknown of the opti-
cal unconscious, instead of the new opportunities for
control?
In her plea for situated knowledge and a feminist
doctrine of objectivity, Haraway also made a case for
taking metaphors seriously by positing the need to
metaphorically emphasize the sense of vision again, in
order to reclaim it from the powers of modern scientiﬁc
objectivity. Precisely because the sense of vision has
been instrumentalized to distance the knowing subject
from the world, and to purge the marked body from all
elements of subjectivity, Haraway foregrounded the
need to reclaim it in diﬀerent terms, terms that insist
on the ‘particularity and embodiment of all vision’
(Haraway, 1988: 582). So instead of using the optical
metaphor to endorse what she terms the views from
nowhere or anywhere, the optical can be repurposed
to investigate the apparatuses of visual production as
‘technologies of positioning’, the conditions of visibility
they give rise to, the kind of subjects they produce, and
the regimes of knowledge they enable or disable. The
optical metaphor can be recast to ask a diﬀerent set of
questions:
How to see? Where to see from? What limits to vision?
What to see for? Who to see with? Who gets to have
more than one point of view? Who gets blinded? Who
wears blinders? Who interprets the visual ﬁeld? What
other sensory powers do we wish to cultivate besides
vision? (Haraway, 1988: 587)
The question that needs to be formulated is then, how
to reconceive of vision to move beyond instrumental
dataﬁcation, implied by data visualization and machine
vision, but also the employment of Big Data for control
and proﬁt more broadly? What kind of vision(s) can be
harnessed towards an ethics of unknowability? In the
ﬁnal section of this article, I explore these questions by
engaging with recent discussions in feminist science and
technology studies revolving around speculative ethics
and care for the unknown. As a mode of thinking about
the possible and the future that is concerned with pro-
voking political and ethical imagination in the present
(rather than predictions or preemptions), speculative
ethics oﬀers a space for articulating possibilities and
opening up ways of understanding and transforming
in the world. These imaginations wish to move
beyond the promise of prediction and control of
unknown futures towards an engagement with possibi-
lities that are beyond the scope of tangible knowledge,
in ways that are ‘responsive and with care’ (Pink et al.,
2018). Within this framework, vision may then be con-
ceived diﬀerently, perhaps not only as an instrument of
sensorial enhancement, calculation and control, but as
generator of new possibilities, or at least a site where
this openness to the unknown can be articulated. While
admittedly exploratory and non-programmatic, these
ﬁnal considerations are oﬀered as a potential opening
to think dataﬁed vision otherwise, guided by Barad’s
suggestion that discursive-material practices can gener-
ate ‘real consequences, interventions, creative possibili-
ties, and responsibilities of intra-acting within and as
part of the world’ (Barad, 2007: 37).
Touching visions for datafied worlds
In her book Matters of Care, Maria Puig de la
Bellacasa explores and expands the meanings of care
for thinking and living in more than human worlds.
While care can be understood as a human ethico-poli-
tical obligation, she argues that it does not mean that it
is a human-only matter. The scope of Bellacasa’s reﬂec-
tion revolves around naturecultures, but the questions
she raises are worth expanding to think about dataﬁed
worlds. Taking her questions further, we could ask: in
order to move beyond dataﬁcation as calculation and
prediction, can we think of care as an ethico-political
obligation that also extends to the unknowns contained
in dataﬁed worlds? Here I am reminded of Wendy
Chun’s remarks towards the end of ‘Crisis, Crisis,
Crisis, or Sovereignty and Networks’, where she
claims that rather than complaining about the fallibility
of predictive technologies, we need to care for them,
and ‘frame their predictions as calls for responsibility’
(Chun, 2011: 160). The point of their predictive
capacity, she posits, is to persuade us to not let that
potential future come to fruition. It is precisely in this
gap between these future predictions and the future
materializations that a care ethics with and for data
needs to be formulated.
Chun’s call for care and responsibility resonates with
Bellacasa’s proposition of a speculative ethics in more
than human worlds, as a mode of thought about the
possible that is concerned with provoking political and
ethical imagination in the present, that is, in the gap
between predicted and materialized futures. This polit-
ical imagination of the possible is fundamentally con-
cerned with crafting visions of other worlds with
awareness, care and responsibility for what is not yet
known. Such a call is consistent with what Astrida
Neimanis terms ‘an ethics of unknowability’, a position
that emphasizes care towards the incalculable:
The future is always an open question, and our bodies
must be understood as ﬂowing beyond the bounds of
what is knowable. [. . .] On this ‘ever-changing landscape
of continuous interplay, intra-action, emergence, and
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risk’, even as we insist upon accountability, we must also
make decisions that eschew certainty and necessary
courses of action. This is an ethics of unknowability.
(Neimanis, 2012: 109–110)
To cultivate such an ethics of unknowability requires
us to redirect vision away from calculation towards
care for unknown futures.
The question of care can be brought together with
the problem of vision discussed earlier insofar as both
care and vision can be entangled with hegemonic
regimes but also reclaimed for transformative orienta-
tions. In this sense, within a speculative mode of think-
ing, both vision and care can be conceived as generators
of new possibilities or sites of transformation. Feminist
theory has long pointed out that care is not an uncon-
tested notion or practice, bound as it is with histories of
non-care and neglect, the violence of interdependence,
the essentialization of women’s experience, uneven allo-
cation, paternalistic orientations in institutionalized
settings or the complicity with colonizing projects
(Baraitser, 2017; Murphy, 2015; Tronto, 2010). Under
neoliberal governance, the political potential of care as
a ‘category of feminist organizing’ (Sharma, 2018) has
been co-opted to become a pervasive order of indivi-
dualized biopolitics, while its institutionalization has
devalued the concept of care, which is seen as synonym
with dependency and disempowerment. Within feminist
ethics of care, there is a sense that care needs to be
reclaimed both from idealized conceptions (care as a
loving and feminine task separate from politics) and
denigrating meanings. The transformation that care
ethics seeks is that care thinking (or thinking with
care) will impact on the way we think about politics
and the way political action is conceived and enacted
through mutual responsibility (Tronto, 2013). This
thinking with care, I suggest, calls for, and runs parallel
to, a diﬀerent conceptualization of the sense of sight
invested in the speculative imagination of possible
worlds. In other words, how to cultivate visions with
care for the unknown futures, instead of attempts to
predict, preempt and capitalize the future?
Related to the sense of sight, the speculative is trad-
itionally associated with vision and observation. But the
notion of speculative vision can also suggest a detach-
ment from material conditions, as in the expression
‘pure speculation’. Here the potential of the speculative
is marred by the history of scientiﬁc observation and
objectivity that tended to favour a disembodied engage-
ment with the material world, views from nowhere and
anywhere to use Haraway’s terms. This fraught history
of observation led to calls across diﬀerent disciplines,
not least in the ﬁeld of visual culture, to counter ocular-
centric bias and pay attention to other dimensions of
sensorial experience (Classen, 2012; Marks, 2002;
Howes, 2003; Parisi and Archer, 2017; Pink, 2015;
Sobchack, 1992). This ‘sensuous scholarship’ (Stoller,
1997) has also become particularly relevant within crit-
ical data studies due to the wide embodied spectrum of
data eﬀects, from sensing to tracking and measuring,
whereby bodies and data are diﬀerently co-constituted
through various senses in contemporary dataﬁed worlds
(Kaziunas et al., 2017; Lupton, 2017). Because our inter-
actions or intra-actions with data occur not only
through sight, but also through touch and sound, the
hand and the voice, the place of the living body in data
gathering and processing operations is being increas-
ingly explored, both empirically and theoretically. And
since the body generates an immense variety of data,
from health monitoring to security scannings and
voice recognition, an exclusive focus on the visual can
be said to occlude this bodily investment into and by
data. Now more than ever, processes of dataﬁcation, as
Me´l Hogan puts it, operate through the ﬂesh – ‘the indi-
vidual ﬂesh and the ﬂesh of the world’ (Hogan, 2018).
Such realisations invite us to probe further into the
kinds of embodied experiences these encounters
between human bodies, data and other involved
agents elicit or generate.
Responding to such sensory developments, Bellacasa
proposes to turn to touch as a sensorial universe that
might provide the conditions for an ethics of care to be
formulated, as touch oﬀers the promise to overcome the
disengaged distance associated with knowledge-as-
vision (Bellacasa, 2017: 95–112). Yet, she cautions
against the potential pitfalls of touch: because touch
shortens distance, it can also misguide us into conﬂat-
ing touch with immediacy and authentic connection to
the real, or to substitute claims of transparent and
unpolluted observation with desires of ‘direct and
extended accelerated eﬃcient intervention’ through
touch. She posits that touch cannot be presumed to
improve caring per se, nor to necessarily challenging
oppressive conﬁgurations (Bellacasa, 2017: 112).
These reservations towards the haptic as a sense more
ethically attuned or politically signiﬁcant are ampliﬁed
by the proliferation of embedded technologies that
increasingly merge bodies with data, wherein the need
for the sense of touch apparently disappears, making it
even more diﬃcult to pinpoint the senses that mediate
our encounter with data. One could add that touch, too,
has long been part of the history of violence and control
that informs current dataﬁed practices of surveillance
for instance (Browne, 2015). So if touch does not neces-
sarily overcome the shortcomings of sight, and in fact
may even reproduce and entrench them through haptic
conﬁgurations, what kinds of sensorial arrangements
could emphasize an ethical awareness regarding the
material consequences of dataﬁed knowledge?
Inspired by Haraway’s plea to reclaim the sense of
vision, Bellacasa proposes to engage with touch to
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reclaim vision through what she terms ‘touching
visions’. Refusing the distinction between vision and
touch, and the divide between distanced objective
vision and subjective, embodied contact, she fore-
grounds ‘touching visions’ as sensorial engagements
that foreground a desire for tangible relations and
grounded transformations, rather than perceptual or
sensorial enhancement. Though there are indeed
many things that knowledge-as-distant vision fails to
feel, vision can also challenge the idealization of close-
ness and the superiority of knowledge in proximity.
Aware of the possible perils of touch, these visions do
not seek a hold on reality through ‘improved grasp’,
but a relatedness with material reality through care
and an ethical awareness about material consequences.
Rather than opening up ‘super visual worlds’, or mas-
tering the unseen and the unknown, a recognition of
mutual vulnerability is the ultimate desideratum of
‘touching visions’. Touching is not here a promise of
enhanced and privileged contact with reality but rather
an invitation to attune to its neglected perceptions.
Karen Barad’s account of the scanning tunnelling
microscope can be taken as a touching-vision propos-
ition. According to Barad, these microscopes, used to
scan surfaces at atomic level, function through ‘very dif-
ferent physical principles than visual sight’ (Barad,
2007: 53). Her account of the scanning tunnelling micro-
scope describes an encounter with the atomic world that
engages the sense of touch rather than sight, where the
microscope is not used solely to view atoms ‘but to pick
them and move them’ (Barad, 2007: 50). Rather than
visualizing atomic reality, this technology scans and
‘feels’ the surface through a microscope tip that is man-
euvered across the surface of the specimen being imaged.
Here there is no separation between observing and
touching; through this technology, vision is not separate
from direct material engagement, from being in relation
with the physical world. Vision as touch thus appears as
a sensorial entanglement of multiple materialities
whereby not only the microscope touches the surface,
but the surface also has an eﬀect on the mediating
device of touching vision (Bellacasa, 2017: 114).
Taking this proposition further, one could argue that
this notion of ‘touching vision’ acknowledges the sen-
sorial entanglements already inherent to, and activated
by, each one of the senses. Within visual culture theory,
the visual is not necessarily conﬂated with optical facul-
ties, but rather taken as an analytical focus that ‘also
compels attention to the tactile, the auditory, the
haptic, and the phenomenon of synesthesia’ (Mitchell,
2002: 170). As ﬁlm theorist Vivian Sobchack reminds us,
as lived bodies, ‘our vision is always already ﬂeshed out’
(Sobchack, 2004: 60). Phenomenologically, vision is
always haptic, as eyes refract waves sensed by the
cornea, signals that touch us. But more than this,
visual perception, our sense of visual recognition of
things, is always informed by a broader sensory engage-
ment with material reality, the same way the sense of
sight solicits the other senses in its encounter with the
world. At the same time, touch is not to be merely equa-
ted with physical contact, but understood more broadly
as a mode of being in the world through which the body
presents itself to the world and through which it per-
ceives that world as sensible (Barker, 2009: 2). The hap-
ticality implicit in ‘touching visions’ may more aptly be
understood as feeling through others, with feeling stand-
ing not only for a tactile mode of sensing the world, but
also – and more ethically signiﬁcantly – as a mode of
engagement with and through other beings in the world.
Touching visions thus draw attention to the possi-
bility of touching and being touched by what we
observe, and what observes us. And here I would like
to recapture the etymology of observation to make a
ﬁnal point about the importance of attending to the
visual models through which we encounter the world.
In Techniques of the Observer, Jonathan Crary submits
that to observe, more than looking at, means to con-
form one’s actions, to comply with, ‘as in observing
rules, codes, regulations and practices. Though obvi-
ously one who sees, an observer is more importantly
one who sees with a prescribed set of possibilities, one
who is embedded in a system of conventions and limi-
tations’ (Crary, 1992: 6). While Crary is concerned here
with the formation of the modern viewing subject, and
the disciplining techniques that this subject is consti-
tuted by, there is also a notion of compliance and
adherence that can be diﬀerently explored. What if we
retain the idea of observance and obligation contained
in observation but redirect it towards a practice of care?
Implicit in observance is also a practice of respect, as in
observing a custom, a ritual, a holiday, to act in
acknowledgment out of respect for something or some-
one. More than complying with a prescription or a rule
that compels us to observe, observance is a practice of
paying attention and caring for others, not just follow-
ing a rule, but giving proper heed to, an engagement
with others, also unknown others. Observance thus also
solicits a collective imagining, a collective act of accord-
ance with a ritual that is not about following a pre-
scribed set of customs but to gather around an act of
care towards something. This notion of observance
beyond prescription, as deliberate act of care, chal-
lenges the alleged passivity or the desire to master
which observation is still conﬂated with. It also con-
jures a notion of care that is not bound with a moral
obligation but with acknowledgement and responsibil-
ity, of reciprocal obligation to others, observing as feel-
ing through others (Ahmed, 2010). Observance can
thus be seen as a practice of touching vision, a model
of vision that goes beyond mastery or enhancement of
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knowledge towards a collective call for responsibility,
of engagement with others with a sense of awareness
and care for unknown futures.
With this article I sought to argue that what might
be seen as an anachronistic persistence of the optical in
the imagination of Big Data can be taken as a call to
investigate the persistence of opticality in data prac-
tices, as well as to reconceptualize inherited meanings
of vision. What I have termed the optical unconscious
of Big Data – whereby the sense of sight is both dis-
placed and mobilised by data – thus draws attention to
entrenched modes of knowledge that ﬁnd their way into
current and emerging epistemic ﬁelds. The optical
unconscious is therefore indicative of an opticality
that is encoded into the dataﬁcation of vision, and
which extends, through dataﬁed means, modes of
observation and subject positions privileged by
modern optics. Yet, I also argue that this opticality
invites for a reconsideration of the theories of vision
that Big Data is being informed by. Through a specu-
lative mode of thinking, we might reimagine the micro-
scope of Big Data as a scanning tunnelling microscope,
one that does not separate seeing from touching, where
vision is not separate from direct material engagement,
and where knower and known cannot be considered
apart. We might then redirect the sense of sight cur-
rently invested in the imagination of Big Data towards
a mode of sensorial engagement that is concerned with
crafting visions of other worlds with care and respon-
sibility for unknown futures. While I suggest that col-
lective imaginations of Big Data must be aware of the
historical models that continue to haunt our relation to
the technological present, I have also tried to open up
the discussion to other modes of thinking about vision
that foster other ways of sensing and inhabiting the
possible. With these reﬂections I hope to contribute
to an enrichment of the meanings of vision in a way
that invites others to consider further sensorial and eth-
ical engagements in emerging dataﬁed worlds.
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Notes
1. I also acknowledge the work of many scholars and creative
practitioners who push the boundaries of the genre of data
visualization towards critical, decolonial and sensorially
expanded modes of observation (Brown, 2015; D’Ignazio
and Klein, 2016; Mackenzie et al., 2017).
2. The Social Media Collective has gathered a reading list of
academic and popular writing on metaphors of data, ran-
ging from ‘data as the new oil’ to data as sweat (Gregg,
2015), data as cloud (Peters, 2015), data as ocean (Lupton,
2013), among others. See https://socialmediacollective.org/
reading-lists/metaphors-of-data-a-reading-list/.
3. Although it engages with Freud’s (1953) psychoanalytic
notion of the unconscious, Benjamin’s notion of ‘optical
unconscious’ departs from it by focusing on the perceptual
enhancement of reality brought about by the technological
media of the time, such as photography and cinema, and
the revolutionary potential contained in this enhancement.
For a detailed reading of Benjamin’s and Freud’s different
interpretations of the unconscious see Smith (2013).
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